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Abstract
The Data for Refugees (D4R) Challenge is a non-profit challenge ini-
tiated to improve the conditions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey by pro-
viding a special database to scientific community for enabling research on
urgent problems concerning refugees, including health, education, unem-
ployment, safety, and social integration.The collected database is based
on anonymised mobile Call Detail Record (CDR) of phone calls and SMS
messages of Tu¨rk Telekom customers. It indicates broad activity and
mobility patterns of refugees and citizens in Turkey for one year. The
data collection period is from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017. The
project is initiated by Tu¨rk Telekom, in partnership with the Turkish Aca-
demic and Research Council (TU¨BI˙TAK) and Bog˘azic¸i University, and in
collaboration with several academic and non governmental organizations,
including UNHCR Turkey, UNICEF, and International Organization for
Migration.
1 Introduction
After the Syrian Civil War started in 2011-12, civilians in increasing numbers
sought refuge in neighboring countries. By May 2017, Turkey had received over
3 million refugees — the largest refugee population in the world. About 30% of
them live in government-run camps near the Syrian border. Many have moved
to cities looking for work and better living conditions. They face problems of
integration, income, welfare, employment, health, education, language, social
tension, and discrimination.1 The Data for Refugees (D4R) Challenge2 is a
1This is the preprint of the D4R Challenge description paper. Please check the Challenge
website for the final version, and the correct citation. Author affiliations: AAS (corresponding
author, salah@boun.edu.tr) - Bog˘azic¸i University and Nagoya University; AP - MIT; BL -
Fondazione Bruno Kessler; EL - MIT and DataPop Alliance; PV - Harvard University; Y-
AdM - Imperial College London; XD - University of Oxford; O¨D - Tu¨rk Telekom
2http://d4r.turktelekom.com.tr
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non-profit project to ultimately improve the conditions of the Syrian refugees
in Turkey by providing a special database to scientific community for enabling
research on some urgent problems. The challenge datasets opened to the com-
munity are based on anonymised mobile Call Detail Record (CDR) of phone
calls and SMS messages of Tu¨rk Telekom customers. It indicates broad activ-
ity and mobility patterns in Turkey for one year. The D4R Challenge, called
the Challenge hereafter, opens the data to research groups submitting project
proposals, after an evaluation, and on strictly regulated terms. The five fo-
cus themes of the challenge are health, education, unemployment, safety, and
social integration, respectively. The project is initiated by Tu¨rk Telekom, in
partnership with the Turkish Academic and Research Council (TU¨BI˙TAK) and
Bog˘azic¸i University and in collaboration with several academic and non govern-
mental organizations, including UNHCR Turkey, UNICEF, and International
Organization for Migration.
A scientific committee of international experts guides its execution. A
Project Evaluation Committee (PEC)3 is formed with representatives from
academia, government (i.e. ministries related to the challenge), and NGOs
working in this area. This committee represents refugee interests, and its job
is to ensure that the submitted research projects that are granted access to the
data have clear goals, with foreseen benefits to the refugee population in Turkey
and elsewhere. Access to D4R data requires PEC approval.
The general aims of the Data for Refugees (D4R) project are to:
1. Contribute to the welfare of the refugee populations,
2. Gain insights on key issues, including safety and security, health, edu-
cation, unemployment, social integration and segregation, mobility, and
distribution of resources and infrastructure,
3. Help governments and international bodies model the dynamics of the
refugee populations and to discover vulnerabilities (socio-economic vul-
nerabilities, gaps in education and services, etc.),
4. Seed further projects, co-created with refugees, resulting in new applica-
tions, services, and innovative solutions for refugees in Turkey and else-
where.
The lack of data on refugee mobility is a very important hurdle to the proper
functioning of government services and international aid bodies. Innovative
approaches attempted to overcome this included the use of satellite imagery
to obtain information from the regions in crisis, with limited success [1]. This
project will, for the first time, allow the analysis of a large-scale mobile CDR
database on refugees. The D4D Challenges [2, 3] have illustrated the usefulness
of such data, and the numerous projects completed on these challenges provided
insights for social data science. We believe the challenge will be instrumental
in understanding refugee mobility, optimizing infrastructure and humanitarian
3http://d4r.turktelekom.com.tr/presentation/project-evaluation-committee
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help, for better understanding the effects of interventions in health, education,
and integration. Additionally the Challenge, by involving research groups from
all around the globe, aims to raise awareness for the refugee issues on a grand
scale.
The possibilities that mobile CDR data affords for analysis of a broad set of
problems are surveyed in [4]. Examples of projects conducted with similar data
include analysis of disaster resilience [5], infrastructure planning [6], quantify-
ing mobility effects on the spread of infectious diseases [7, 8], developing agent
based models for disease migrations [9], disease containment [10], analysis of
community structures and socio-demographic indicators [11], detection of un-
usual events [12], poverty analysis [13], mobility during holidays and religious
festivals [14], to name a few.
The D4R Challenge has a distinct focus around refugee problems, and aims
to enable evaluation of refugee related interventions and activities, including,
but not limited to, educational activities, social gatherings, NGO actions, gov-
ernment infrastructure investments, etc. It also has the potential to bring in-
sights to the analysis of residential segregation, population structures for specific
geographical locations, and factors on social integration [15].
2 Description of D4R Data
2.1 Brief summary
The D4R Challenge is based on the successful Data for Development (D4D)
Challenge series [2]. Three datasets are made available to the challenge par-
ticipants, along with external helper files. The main difference from D4D is
that D4R has a “Refugee” flag, which indicates (with a high probability) that
the CDR belongs to a refugee customer. This flag is given to customers in the
database that 1) have ID numbers given to refugees and foreigners in Turkey,
2) registered with Syrian passports, 3) use special tariffs reserved for refugees.
None of these groups are guaranteed to include only and exclusively refugees,
which serves as a layer of protection: It is not possible to say with certainty that
a particular CDR belongs to a refugee or not, but it is only possible to derive
patterns from aggregated records. Initially, we have planned to perturb these
labels for adding such a protection, but the collection is already noisy, and no
further noise is introduced. We list the datasets contained in the Challenge in
individual subsections.
We acknowledge that the term “refugee” is used as a blanket term in the
dataset, and includes migrants, asylum seekers, and even foreigners who have
acquired a “temporarily protected foreign individual” ID number in Turkey
(i.e. starting with 98 or 99). The dataset needs to be approached with these
reservations in mind, and the analysis should carefully consider such biases in
the data.
The D4R dataset is collected from 992.457 customers of Tu¨rk Telekom, of
which 184.949 are tagged as “refugees”, and 807.508 as Turkish citizens. A to-
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Location Number of Customers Percentage
I˙stanbul 84.173 45,511
Gaziantep 14.898 8,055
I˙zmir 10.425 5,637
S¸anlıurfa 9.701 5,245
Mersin 9.660 5,223
Hatay 7.024 3,798
Ankara 5.580 3,017
Konya 4.718 2,551
Bursa 3.479 1,881
Outside Turkey 2.902 1,569
Other 32.440 17,540
Table 1: The distribution of customers tagged as refugees and their registered
locations. Numbers rounded to the third significant digit.
tal of 1.211.839 subscriptions are included. Of these, 980.697 belong to Turkish
citizens, and 231.142 belong to refugees (we refer to these customers as refugees,
but as mentioned before, there is some noise in this indicator). Some of the cus-
tomers had multiple phone lines; each line corresponds to a single subscription.
75% of the refugee-tagged customers are recorded as “male”, and 25% as
“female”. There is clearly a gender bias in the ownership of the phone line.
This does not mean that 75% of the phone lines are used by men, however. We
have sampled the 807K Turkish customers with the same gender distribution.
45% of the refugee customers were registered in Istanbul. Other major cities
with refugee presence were Gaziantep, I˙zmir, S¸anlıurfa, and Mersin. We have
sampled the Turkish citizen customers mainly from the cities with registered
refugee presence, to simplify comparisons. Table 1 and Table 2 show the dis-
tribution of customers and their registered cities. Only the top locations are
shown. The distribution over all the cities of the country is provided to the
participants in the file “Refugees per city (March 2017).xls”. This file shows
the official number of refugees registered per city, the official city population
in 2017 (excluding refugees), and the percentage of refugees with respect to
the city population. Additionally, it shows the number of Tu¨rk Telekom cus-
tomers used for the entire D4R data collection per city, broken into “refugee”
and “citizen” counts. The numbers of registered refugees and asylum seekers in
Turkey according to registration dates can be obtained from UNHCR websites4.
Another useful source of data is the TUIK census estimates for Turkish cities,
according to years5. This source indicates the population size and growth of
each city between 2000-2017.
The usage of the D4R data requires caution in interpreting the representa-
tiveness of the data for the refugee population in Turkey. At the end of March
2017, there were 75.724.413 mobile customers in Turkey across all operators
4See https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113
5See http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=1590
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Location Number of Customers Percentage
I˙stanbul 363.334 44,994
Gaziantep 80.655 9,988
I˙zmir 40.501 5,016
Ankara 40.443 5,009
Adana 40.415 5,005
Hatay 40.394 5,002
Konya 40.388 5,002
Antalya 40.367 4,999
Bursa 40.359 4,998
S¸anlıurfa 40.321 4,993
Mersin 40.242 4,983
Table 2: The distribution of customers tagged as Turkish citizens and their
registered locations. Numbers rounded to the third significant digit.
(%94,9 penetration rate) [16]. Excluding machine to machine (M2M) and pop-
ulation of 0-9 age range, the mobile penetration was %107. According to data
from the first three months of 2017, the mobile market share of Tu¨rk Telekom
(Avea), from which the challenge data is collected, was %24,7 [16].
We have used the entire refugee customer base (with the filtering conditions
described before), but the market share of Tu¨rk Telekom also shows fluctuations
according to the individual cities. Therefore, it is useful to look at official
numbers of refugees distributed over the country. This is partly depicted in
Fig. 1 as per Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management
figures6. However, these figures are from 2018. We have supplied the official
figures from March 2017, as mentioned before.
We now describe the contents of the dataset in more detail.
2.2 Cell tower locations
The cell tower (i.e. base station) locations are provided in the file “Base Station Location.txt”.
The file contains the following fields:
• BTS ID: The identifier of the base tower.
• MX LAT1,MX LAT2,MX LAT3: DMS latitude of the base tower.
• MX LONG1,MX LONG2,MX LONG3: DMS longitude of the base tower.
• MX SAHAIL: The registered city of the base tower.
• MX SAHAILCE: The registered district of the base tower.
6Only the top ten cities are shown, more detailed information can be obtained from http:
//www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/migration-statistics_915_1024.
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Figure 1: The distribution of refugees in the country according to data from
Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management.
• MX POPAREA: An inofficial note about the population type around the
base tower, used internally in Tu¨rk Telekom. It takes values of RURAL,
SUB URBAN, INDUSTRIAL, SEASONAL AREAS, DENSE URBAN,
HOT SPOT, OPEN IN URBAN, AIRPORT, SUBURBANLOW, POPRU-
RAL, and INDOOR.
In some rare cases, the precise location information of the base station is missing,
only the city is indicated. The interpretation of the latitude and longitude
follows degree, minutes, seconds (DMS) syntax. For example, the district of
BARTIN in the city of ZONGULDAK is represented by these six numbers as
follows: (41 25 43.1184 32 4 37.9344). This corresponds to 41◦25′43.1184′′ N
DMS latitude, and 32◦4′37.9344′′ E longitude.
2.3 District locations
To disambiguate the base stations, we provide a file that contains district coor-
dinates. This file, named “district coordinates.csv”, has the following fields:
• CITY: Name of the city.
• DISTRICT: Name of the district.
• POPULATION 2014: The official census population of the district in
2014.
• LATITUDE, LONGITUDE: The 2D coordinates of the district.
• MX LAT1, MX LAT2, MX LAT3, MX LONG1, MX LONG2, MX LONG3:
The DMS coordinates of the district.
A conversion script (such as https://www.latlong.net/lat-long-dms.
html) can be used to convert the (latitude, longitude) variables into DMS. For
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example, the 2D coordinates of (41.428644 32.077204) for Zonguldak, Bartın,
translate into the DMS coordinates given in the previous subsection.
2.4 Dataset 1: Antenna Traffic
The first database we provide includes one year site-to-site traffic on an hourly
basis. This dataset contains the traffic between each site for a year. Calls
between Tu¨rk Telekom (TT) customers and other service providers (SP) only
have information about the TT side. For each record, total number and duration
of calls are recorded in an aggregated fashion.
The database is split into voice and SMS partitions. For the voice partition,
the file “Dataset 1 2017XX.txt” contains the data for month XX, and there are
12 such files. Each file contains the following fields:
• TIMESTAMP: Day and hour considered in format DD-MM-YYYY HH
(24 hours format).
• OUTGOING SITE ID: ID of the site the call originated from. Unknown
stations are denoted as “-99” or “9999”.
• INCOMING SITE ID: ID of the site receiving the call.
• NUMBER OF CALLS: The number of calls in this 1 hour slot.
• NUMBER OF REFUGEE CALLS: The number of calls involving num-
bers tagged as “refugee”.
• NUMBER OF TOTAL CALL DURATION: The total call duration from
all calls.
• REFUGEE CALL DURATION: The total call duration from calls involv-
ing numbers tagged as “refugee”.
For the SMS partition, the file “Dataset 1 SMS 2017XX.txt” contains the
data for month XX, and there are 12 such files. Each file contains the following
fields:
• TIMESTAMP: Day and hour considered in format DD-MM-YYYY HH
(24 hours format).
• OUTGOING SITE ID: ID of site the SMS originated from. Unknown
stations are denoted as “-99” or “9999”.
• INCOMING SITE ID: ID of the site receiving the SMS.
• NUMBER OF SMS: The number of SMS messages in this 1 hour slot.
• NUMBER OF REFUGEE SMS: The number of SMS messages involving
numbers tagged as “refugee”.
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2.5 Dataset 2: Fine Grained Mobility
The dataset contains cell tower identifiers used by a group of randomly chosen
active users to make phone calls and send texts. The data are timestamped and
a particular group of users are observed for a period of 2 weeks. At the end of
the two-week period, a fresh sample of active users are drawn at random. We
provide data for the entire 1-year sampling period. The users are represented by
random numbers in the dataset, and no personal information is stored. These
numbers start with 1 for refugees, 2 for non-refugees, 3 for unknown. However,
this indicator should be considered to be somewhat noisy. Among the users who
are marked as refugees, there may be customers who are not refugees, and vice
versa. Consequently, it will not be possible to say with 100% certainty whether
an invitation CDR belongs to a refugee or not. (This numbering scheme is also
used for Dataset 3.) There is no identifying information about the other party
of the call; only the callee prefix (1: refugee, 2: not refugee, 3: unknown) is
given.
To protect privacy, new random identifiers are chosen for every two-week
period, and if a user is sampled in more than one period, these records cannot
be associated with each other. For missing antenna locations, a code of -99 or
9999 is assigned. This dataset is also separated into voice and SMS partitions.
Furthermore, to deal with large file sizes, it is further divided into files contain-
ing incoming (IN) and outgoing (OUT) calls, resulting in four files per 15-day
period.
The files “Dataset 2 2017XXW In.txt,” “Da-taset 2 2017XXW Out.txt,”
“Dataset 2 2017XXW SMS In.txt,” and “Dataset 2 2017XXW SMS Out.txt”
all have similar structure, where XX ranges from 01 to 26, and denotes a 15-
day period, starting from 1-15 January 2017 in the first file. The files have the
following fields:
• CALLER ID: Random number for a user generated specifically for this
15-day period. Note that the user is not necessarily the initiator of the
call, that is determined by the CALL TYPE flag. The first digit denotes
“refugee” (1), “non-refugee” (2), “unknown” (3).
• TIMESTAMP: Day and hour considered in format DD-MM-YYYY HH
(24 hours format).
• CALLEE PREFIX: A value for the other party of the call that denotes
“refugee” (1), “non-refugee” (2), “unknown” (3).
• SITE ID: The ID of the base station.
• CALL TYPE: The Call type is either outgoing (1) or incoming (2).
2.6 Dataset 3: Coarse Grained Mobility
In this dataset, the trajectories of a randomly selected subset of users are pro-
vided for the entire observation period, but with reduced spatial resolution.
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We divide the entire country into the electoral prefectures (or districts), and
for each call record, only the prefecture information is provided. The IDs are
randomly assigned, and two different users may have the same ID in Dataset 2
and Dataset 3. The database is split into incoming (IN) and outgoing (OUT)
calls to deal with large files. The files “Dataset 3 2017XX In.txt” and “Dataset
3 2017XX Out.txt” have a similar structure, and contain the fields:
• CALLER ID: The randomly assigned ID of the user (different from Dataset
2). Similarly to Dataset 2, the call initiator is determined by CALL TYPE.
• TIMESTAMP: Day and time considered in format DD-MM-YYYY HH:MM
(24 hours format).
• ID: The ID of the district.
• CITY ID: The ID of the city.
In order to achieve the mapping to the cities and prefectures, two additional
files are provided. In “Dataset 3 City Mapping.txt,” the CITY ID is followed by
CITY DESC, which is the name of the city. 81 cities are included. In “Dataset
3 District Mapping.txt,” the ID field represents the district ID, as used in the
Dataset 3, and the BTS DISTRICT field gives the name of the district. There
are a total of 1025 districts.
3 Ethical and privacy issues
In this section, we briefly discuss the ethical and privacy issues regarding the
Challenge data. The collection, storage and protection of data in the D4R Chal-
lenge complies with European Union requirements regarding the protection of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector. Furthermore, research on the previously conducted D4D Challenges
established that the data such as offered in this project does not allow iden-
tification of individuals [17, 18, 19, 20]. Sharad and Danezis note that pro-
viding aggregated data such as antenna traffic results in “little scope of privacy
breach. . . since it contains no personally identifiable information about the users.
It could be used to study traffic patterns during the entire period but reveals
no information pertaining to the users.” [21].
Definitions: Personal data means any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person. Personal data does not include anonymous infor-
mation, that is, information that does not relate to an identified or identifiable
natural person or to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the Data
Subject is not or is no longer identifiable. Data Subject means a natural person
(i.e. an individual) who can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to Personal Data.
Consent, legitimate and fair processing: The data in the Database
comes exclusively from Tu¨rk Telekom customers, who has consented to its
anonymised use for research purposes through the mandatory user agreement at
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the time of the purchase of the phone line. The content of phone activity, actual
phone numbers, identities, addresses, or similar personal information are neither
stored, nor distributed with the Database. Subsequently, it is not possible to
identify natural persons with the Database.
Transparent processing: The nature of the data, the assurance of its
anonymity, as well as the ethical precautions to ensure its proper use are (at
the time of the start of the Challenge) documented openly on the Challenge
website. Accessible and plain language is used, and further contact information
is supplied to respond to questions about the data usage.
Project Evaluation Committee (PEC): The PEC is formed with repre-
sentatives from academia, government, and related NGOs. Its aim is to repre-
sent refugee interests in the Challenge, and all project proposals are pre-screened
by the Scientific Committee and by PEC. The proposals that pass the initial
screening are granted access to the dataset, upon submitting the signed User
Agreement form. Criteria for passing the initial screening were:
• A project proposal is submitted (in English, which is the common language
for the international PEC), and all the team members who will access the
data are identified.
• The project PI has a permanent affiliation.
• The project uses the D4R data meaningfully.
• The project aims are aligned with the goals described in the previous
section, do not represent a commercial interest, and do not endanger the
privacy or well-being of individuals or groups.
Data access for the Database is granted to participants during the designated
Challenge period, by a mandatory user agreement prepared by Tu¨rk Telekom
lawyers, and approved by ADIEK, the Ethical Conduct committee of Bog˘azic¸i
University. The agreement permits third parties to analyze the anonymised and
aggregated data, summarized previously, to submit a research report at the end
of the Challenge and to present the results at a special workshop. A white paper
is be prepared to inform the related government bodies and NGOs about the
results of the projects. The project reports are published publicly on the project
website, after evaluation by the D4R PEC and D4R SC. There are three possible
outcomes for submitted reports: (1) Normal publication, for papers that treat
the ethical issues correctly. (2) Ask to consider adjustments, for papers that
require amendments and removal of sensitive material before publication. We
ask the projects to be careful not to include statements that may harm the
refugee population in any way, or may promote negative sentiments about the
refugee populations. (3) Do Not Publish, either because the report is on a
sensitive issue, or because it is not scientifically rigorous and its conclusions are
not warranted. Sensitive reports may be shared directly with related institutions
or authorities. The PEC and the project proposers jointly decide on this, on a
case by case basis.
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Retention, destruction and archiving: The Challenge mandates that all
participants destroy the Database upon completing the challenge. Any publica-
tion based on the Database requires the pre-approval of the Project Evaluation
Committee. Any further use of the Database (for instance to complete numeri-
cal experiments for a publication under review) will be regulated by PEC, and
extensions are to be conditionally granted for specific purposes on a case by case
basis.
Information: Every care has been given to ensure that the information
provided in the Database does not cause any harm, prejudice, or distress to
customers, regardless of their refugee status. PEC provides an additional layer
of control, and will examine project reports confirm to this maxim.
Access, correction, erasure, objection: The Database does not contain
personal information, and it is not possible for individuals to request access to
personal data. The data are anonymised and aggregated in a way to prevent
identification of persons. For the same reason, correction, erasure, and objection
do not apply for the Database. We note that this is a stricter protection con-
dition than most envisioned CDR usage scenarios. Furthermore, the Database
does not contain children’s data, as each registered customer has to be over 18
years of age, and thus legally permitted to own and use a mobile phone line.
Personal profiling (such as used for CRM applications) is not possible with the
Database.
Responsibility and accountability: The responsibilities of all parties
concerned are defined clearly, and set out in the data agreement prepared by
TT lawyers.
Data protection by design and default: Data collection follows this
principle, where any names, real phone numbers, or other identifying informa-
tion is excluded from the design of the Database. The pseudo-random numbers
representing customers are not stored anywhere along with actual phone num-
bers. Subsequently, the anonymisation works only one way. Refugee status
is indicated by purposefully noisy indicators, and no effort is spent to ensure
its validity. Subsequently, only aggregate-level conclusions can be drawn from
the Database. It is not possible to use the Database for the surveillance and
tracking of individuals.
Limitations: Data access is not provided to institutions in a blanket per-
mission, but to specific individuals within institutions, whose names and roles
in the proposed research project is clearly defined in the data agreement.
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